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retains the core claim of classical legal moralism that morality as such 3 should be legally enforced, while having implications for legislation that are closer to liberalism than to classical legal moralism. 4 In this paper, I argue that according to Michael Moore's influential version of this theory infidelity should be criminalized, and thus one should either embrace the criminalization of infidelity or accept that Moore's theory is in need of revision. Regardless of which alternative one embraces the case of infidelity raises some questions about the possibility of liberal legal moralism.
First, I examine Moore's liberal legal moralism. Second, I justify assuming that infidelity is morally wrong. Third, I discuss whether any reasons against criminalizing what is morally wrong can outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity because it is morally wrong. Fourth, I make some concluding remarks regarding the possibility of liberal legal moralism.
Moore's Liberal Legal Moralism
I focus on the seminal version of legal moralism defended by Michael Moore. I share this focus with prominent contemporary critics of legal moralism, such as Antony Duff and Douglas Husak.
5
Legal moralism is a theory of criminal legislation which seeks to tell us what conduct ought to be criminal. 6 Moore derives his legal moralist theory of criminal legislation from his retributivist theory of the proper aim of punishment, according to which it is intrinsically valuable that those who commit moral wrongs are punished. 7 For Moore the aim of criminal legislation is to realize this value by instituting punishment for (i.e., criminalizing) all moral wrongs and only moral wrongs. 8 Legal moralism is both a theory of the proper legislative motivation according to which also seems to point towards a liberal legal moralism; see "The Enforcement of Morals Revisited," Criminal Law and Philosophy 7, no. 3 (October 2013): 435-454. 3 By "morality as such" I mean all of morality as opposed to a specific part of morality (e.g., moral prohibitions against harming others). 4 
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the only proper motivation of criminal legislation is the "prevention and punishment of wrongdoing" 9 (Moore seems especially keen on emphasizing that his legal moralism does not permit legislation to be motivated by the paternalist concerns about bettering the criminal 10 ) and a criterion of justified legislation which demands that the criminalized conduct is in fact morally wrong (i.e., that the properly motivated legislator is not mistaken about the moral wrongness of the criminalized conduct). of criminalizing any particular moral wrong, X, is directly proportional to the desert of those who do X. The desert of those who do X is in turn a product of the degree to which X is morally wrong, and the moral culpability with which they did X.
Liberal Legal Moralism: Means and Ends
Moore frequently emphasizes that his legal moralism is a liberal legal moralism, 14 which is "quite liberal-in-outcome, if not liberal-in-form." 15 I take this to mean that, while liberalism and Moore's legal moralism are incompatible intensionally, Moore's legal moralism and liberalism have quite
4 similar implications for which legislation is justified. 16 Moore mentions only three criminal prohibitions which are justified according to his version of legal moralism, but not according to liberalism: prohibitions against cruelty to animals, mutilation of dead bodies and the extinction of a species. 17 Moore must hold these differences between the legislative implications of his version of legal moralism and liberalism to be relatively unimportant compared to the differences between liberalism and classical legal moralism, which is not quite liberal-in-outcome. Moore writes:
What makes him [the liberal legal moralist] a liberal is how he comes out at the end of the day assessing the rightness of laws dealing with homosexuality, abortion and the like.
18
But what makes criminalizing cruelty to animals, the mutilation of dead bodies and the extinction of a species compatible with being quite liberal-in-outcome, while criminalizing homosexuality is not? I suggest that a legal moralist theory, LM 1 , is liberal when the legislation which is justified according to LM 1 but not according to liberalism, would not be regarded as obviously and pretheoretically unjust by liberals. For instance, the reasons any given liberal will give for not being a legal moralist are far more likely to be opposition to the criminalization of conduct, such as homosexuality than opposition to criminalizing the mutilation of dead bodies, even if the latter is also regarded as being incompatible with liberalism. If I am right in this, liberal legal moralism should be understood as a version of legal moralism, which has rather few legislative implications not shared by liberalism, and when the implications do differ, they only differ in the case of relatively uncontroversial laws.
Moore uses two strategies to make his legal moralism more liberal-in-outcome. All of this remains to be argued. In this section, I merely hope to convince the reader that at least one of the following propositions must be true: 1) Infidelity is not morally wrong.
2) The reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity is outweighed by one or more reasons against criminalizing infidelity.
3) Moore's legal moralism should be revised.
4) Infidelity should be criminalized.
I do not argue at length that 1) is false, but will provide some reasons to believe this is so in the next section. I devote the greater part of this paper to showing that 2) is false. When discussing 2) I only discuss the reasons against criminalizing what is morally wrong explicitly mentioned by 28 Duff, Answering for Crime, 145.
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Moore. 29 There may be some other value, unmentioned by Moore, which allows him to deny that infidelity should be criminalized, while remaining true to his theory. However, it is unclear what that value should be. If 1) and 2) are false, then either 3) or 4) must be true. I do not argue here, whether 3) or 4) (or both) should be accepted. Both propositions seem interesting enough.
Importantly, in this paper, I do not argue that infidelity should not be criminalized. Rather the argument is that either 3) or 4) must be true, and therefore either Moore's legal moralism should be revised, or infidelity should be criminalized. I assume the former is interesting enough in itself, while accepting the latter will show that Moore's legal moralism is not quite liberal-in-outcome at all, which is also interesting. I now move on to discuss 1).
The Assumption of the Moral Wrongfulness of Infidelity
An obvious way to deny that Moore's legal moralism implies that infidelity should be criminalized is to deny that infidelity is morally wrong. This corresponds to the first strategy for making legal moralism liberal. In this section, I provide some reasons for assuming that infidelity is normally morally wrong. A commits infidelity when:
A has sexual relations with C, while A is in a committed romantic relationship with B, and B does not consent to the sexual relationship between A and C. 
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a certain kind of sexual act. For instance, the coercion and violence involved in rape presumably play a key role in making rape severely morally wrong. Likewise, the wrongfulness of infidelity does not consist solely in being a certain kind of sexual act, but rather in either the known and foreseen consequences of infidelity or the breach of a deontological rule (against something else than certain kinds of sexual acts). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that infidelity is normally morally wrong, though I have provided no conclusive argument.
How Wrongful is Infidelity?
Since the case in favour of criminalizing infidelity is to be weighed against the reasons not to criminalize infidelity, it becomes important to know how seriously wrongful infidelity is, and whether we can formulate a law that criminalizes the (sufficiently) wrongful instances of infidelity, without criminalizing instances of infidelity that are not (sufficiently) wrongful. Infidelity may be like suicide which is sometimes seriously wrongful, 36 but sometimes not and the factors determining its wrongfulness are too many and varied to incorporate in a law. 37 However, it seems that this is not so, and that it is possible to formulate a law that only captures (sufficiently) wrongful instances of infidelity through a specification of what is meant by "committed romantic relationship." This is because, assuming infidelity is wrong, the features that make it morally wrong are almost certain to increase in strength proportionally to the length of the romantic relationship, and so does the degree to which we can be certain of the wrongfulness of infidelity in the first place. First, the longer A and B have been romantically involved, the greater the chance that they have either clearly established that B consents to A having sexual relations with C, thus making A's infidelity fall outside the definition of criminal infidelity, or that B does not consent to such relations, thus making infidelity the breach of an explicit promise. Second, the longer A and B have been romantically involved, the more likely and the more certain it is that A's infidelity will severely hurt B. Ceteris paribus being deceived by your boyfriend of 30 days is less hurtful than being deceived by your husband of 30 years. Third, it is trivially true, that the longer the duration of a romantic relationship, the more time has been invested in the relationship. If nothing else 36 Cf. Ibid., 791-792. 37 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility and providing the example.
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there is a "romantic opportunity cost" of being in the relationship which is directly proportional to the investment of time in a romantic relationship, since this time could have been spent building a life with a faithful partner. Furthermore, the longer the duration of a romantic relationship, the greater the chance that B has based life-changing decisions on her belief in A's fidelity, such as turning down otherwise attractive job offers because the job is too far away from A's work, or refrained from moving to an otherwise attractive location because it is too far away from A's residence.
Thus, both the severity of the wrong-making features of infidelity and the certainty with which we can know they are present will uniformly rise with the duration of a romantic relationship. Therefore, for the purposes of a hypothetical statue criminalizing infidelity, whether a romantic relationship is committed is determined in part by the duration of the romantic relationship. Because of the relation between the wrong-making features of infidelity and the duration of a romantic relation, it will be possible to specify a duration of a romantic relationship beyond which we can reasonably assume that infidelity is always 38 quite seriously morally wrong. I have no certain answer to what the relevant duration is, but for purposes of illustration assume that a romantic relationship is committed, when A and B have been romantically involved for at least three years. This concludes my discussion of the immorality of infidelity. I now move on to discuss the reasons against criminalizing what is morally wrong in relation to infidelity.
Reasons Not to Criminalize Infidelity
In this section, I discuss whether any reason not to criminalize what is morally wrong outlined by Post-print The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11572-015-9370-5.
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Positive Liberty and the Desire for Free Choice
Positive liberty to X is the ability to X. Negative liberty to do X is a necessary condition of positive liberty to do X. According to Moore, positive liberty is a good. 44 When discussing whether the value of positive liberty can give us a reason not to criminalize infidelity which outweighs the positive reason to criminalize infidelity, we must ignore the instrumental value of positive liberty as a means to be the author of one's own life, since this conflates the value of positive liberty with the value of Millian autonomy, which is discussed later. Not all criminal laws take an equal amount of positive liberty. They differ on two dimensions. First, criminal laws that make positive requirements (e.g., Good Samaritan laws) take more positive liberty than criminal laws that make negative requirements. Since persons cannot usually do multiple things at once, legally requiring persons to do X deprives them of the positive liberty to do all other actions. 45 Second, negative requirements also vary in how much positive liberty they take. 46 Moore compares prohibiting citizens from exiting their homes with prohibiting murder. I take the deeper point to be that the negative liberty to do X is sometimes a precondition for the positive liberty to do a host of other things (the negative liberty to leave one's house is a necessary condition of having the positive liberty to play soccer, go to Venice, etc.), while at other times the negative liberty to do X is hardly a necessary condition of having a positive liberty to anything other than X is itself (the negative liberty to commit murder is unnecessary for the positive liberty do many more things than commit murder). 47 Plainly, criminalizing infidelity is making a negative legal requirement. Furthermore, the negative liberty to commit infidelity is unnecessary for the positive liberty to do much more than actually committing infidelity. Since a ban on infidelity is not a ban on fornication in general, the legality of infidelity is unnecessary for the positive liberty of A to have sexual relations with C. A still has the positive liberty to have sex with C, provided he terminates her romantic relationship with B first. The negative liberty to commit infidelity is only a necessary condition of A's positive liberty to have sexual relations with C while being in a committed romantic relationship with B. 44 Ibid., 186. 45 Ibid., 201. 46 Ibid. So does positive requirements, but since criminalizing infidelity is obviously making a negative requirement I do not discuss this. 47 This seems to me to be what Joel Feinberg covered be his distinction between "limited" and "fecund" options (Feinberg, Harm to Others, 208.)
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Though criminalizing infidelity limits positive liberty, I think these considerations show that it does not limit positive liberty to any particularly great extent, and consequently the value of positive liberty does not provide a very weighty reason against criminalizing infidelity which is alone sufficient to outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity, though it is possible that it is one of a number of reasons that are jointly sufficient.
The desire for free choice is somewhat tricky since its application to the criminalization of infidelity relies on some empirical claims about people's preferences. I do not know whether people strongly desire freedom to choose whether to be faithful to their partners, but at any rate Moore treats this requirement as only having the potential to provide a reason that could outweigh the positive reasons to criminalize minor wrongs. 48 I have attempted to justify the assumption that infidelity is more seriously morally wrongful than that. If that is correct, then people's desire for free choice cannot outweigh the positive reason to criminalize infidelity. I now move on to discuss the value of Kantian autonomy.
Kantian Autonomy
By Post
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The bad of making people act for the wrong reasons must come about through the effect of legislation on those who were going to do the right thing for the right reason before legislation, and who will either do the right thing for the wrong reason (fear of legal punishment) or do the wrong thing after legislation has been passed. Otherwise criminalizing wrongful behaviour would prevent no autonomously chosen rightful behaviour. Thus, for this consideration to be relevant at least one person who was going to do the right thing for the right reason before legislation was passed, must change her reasons so that she now only does the right thing out of fear of legal punishment, or does not do the right thing at all.
However, those who were going to do the right thing when no legislation against Call this "non-consensual polygamy." However, it is far from obvious that prohibiting nonconsensual polygamy is unjust, or at least that it is unjust because it severely infringes on Millian autonomy.
Even though respect for Millian autonomy prima facie provides a weighty reason against criminalizing non-consensual polygamy because A's negative liberty to marry who he wants is important to A's Millian autonomy, the weight of this reason is greatly diminished because it is possible for A to divorce the non-consenting spouse B and then marry C. Thus, the negative liberty to choose who to marry is only limited under a specific set of circumstancesalready being married-which it is possible for A to change at no unreasonable cost-divorcing B.
Thus, a ban on polygamy infringes much less on Millian autonomy than it seems at first sight because the constraints it places on the negative liberty to choose who to marry can be easily and legally circumvented. I suggest that whenever the following six conditions are fulfilled the impact on Millian autonomy of criminalizing X in the circumstances, S 1 , at time, t 1 is greatly reduced:
1) A can and ought to be able to legally do X under S 2 at t 2.
2) It is not unreasonably difficult for A to move from S 1 to S 2.
3) The gap in time between t 1 and t 2 is not unreasonable.
4) A can be held responsible for being under S 1.
5) It is not and ought not to be illegal for A to move from S 1 to S 2.
6) The negative liberty specifically to do X and Y, where Y is only possible in S 1 , is much less important to Millian autonomy than the negative liberty to do X simpliciter.
To claim that the fulfilment of these six conditions makes no difference to the impact on Millian autonomy of legally preventing A from marrying C at S 1 is to claim that it is equally limiting on
19
Millian autonomy not to be able to act on one's second-order choices about who one wants to be immediately, and not to be able to act on one's second-order choices about who one wants to be at all. But this would seem to make Millian autonomy impossible because many autonomyrelevant ends take significant time to realize.
The question is whether 1) through 6) are fulfilled by the action of having sexual relations with somebody other than one's current romantic partner. If they are, then restricting the negative liberty to commit infidelity by criminalizing infidelity infringes much less on Millian autonomy than may be thought because the impact on the negative liberty to choose who to have sexual relations with, which is of particular importance to Millian autonomy, is diminished. 1) through 4) seems unproblematically fulfilled, while both 5) and 6) merit closer discussion. As for 1), A can bring herself into a situation where she can legally have sex with C even though infidelity is criminalized. Namely, A can end the romantic relationship with B. As for 2) and 3), it is neither unreasonably difficult, nor unreasonably time-consuming for A to end the relationship with B, and thus bring herself into a situation, where she can have sex with C. After all the termination of a relationship is an act entirely within A's own power and effective immediately. Regarding 4), barring something like a forced marriage (a crime in its own right), A can be held responsible for being in a relationship with B.
For 5) to be fulfilled, it must be the case that it is not and ought not to be illegal for A to end the relationship with B. Here, one might claim that leaving one's romantic partner ought not to be illegal, because it is not morally wrong. However, many of the suggested reasons infidelity is morally wrong applies equally to leaving one's long-time romantic partner. Terminating a romantic relationship will also often involve knowably and foreseeably deeply hurting someone else, and the breach of promises. Just think of all the things married couples promise each other in their wedding wows. However, prohibiting people from leaving their romantic partners would itself greatly infringe on their Millian autonomy, and would therefore be unjust. Such a prohibition would greatly reduce people's authorship over their own lives in the central respect of forcing them to maintain certain romantic attachments. For this reason, I take 5) to be fulfilled, since it is
20
possible for A to bring herself into a situation where it is legal for her to have sexual relations with C by leaving B, and leaving B ought not to be illegal.
67
For 6) to be fulfilled, it must be the case that restricting the negative liberty to both have sexual relations with somebody other than one's current romantic partner while still remaining in a relationship with this partner does not infringe on Millian autonomy to any great extent. But why should it? To be sure, it might be in A's interest to both have sexual relations with C and remain in a relationship with B, but surely this cannot be enough to show that it is especially important to Millian autonomy. Furthermore, if A's Millian autonomy is greatly infringed upon if he does not have the negative liberty to stand in a certain relation to B, the romantic relationship, while doing something that violates B's conditions for consenting to standing in this relationship to A, being unfaithful, 68 where is the respect for B's autonomy? When A deliberately deceives B about the reasons on which B bases her major self-defining decisions, A actively hinders B in being an author of her own life. I conclude that the negative liberty to simultaneously be in a romantic relationship and have sexual relations with a third party is not very important to Millian autonomy.
It is therefore unlikely that criminalizing infidelity infringes on Millian autonomy to such a degree that the reason against criminalizing infidelity provided by the value of Millian autonomy outweighs the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity. This is fully compatible with believing that the negative liberty to choose one's own sexual partner is highly relevant to Millian autonomy.
Costs of Enforcement
I now discuss whether the costs of enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity. The argument that infidelity should not be criminalized because of the costs of enforcement takes the form of a dilemma: either a law is effectively enforced or it is not. Both effectively enforcing and not effectively enforcing the law must be problematic. If 67 This argument entails that in countries where divorce is illegal an argument for the legality of infidelity could be made on the grounds of Millian autonomy. I here discuss whether Millian autonomy protects infidelity from criminalization in an ideally just society, and in such a society divorce would be legal. 68 Recall that infidelity was the most common cause of divorce across 160 different cultures. (Shackelford, LeBlanc, and Drass, "Emotional Reactions to Infidelity.") This underscores that being unfaithful is often seen as a violation of the deceived party's conditions for being in the romantic relationship.
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either is not problematic, then the costs of enforcement provide no reason against criminalizing infidelity. According to Moore, effectively enforcing a law can be problematic because of the direct economic costs of enforcing the law, 69 and because of costs in morally valuable privacy. 70 Underenforcing a law can be problematic because it creates a crime tariff, causes disrespect for the law in general, creates potential for blackmail, and creates potential for discriminatory enforcement.
71
If the cost of enforcement is a sufficient reason against criminalizing infidelity, we get the following dilemma:
Either A) The criminal ban on infidelity is effectively enforced,
Or
B) The criminal ban on infidelity is not effectively enforced.
If A), then:
C) The direct economic costs of enforcing the law, the decrease in morally valuable privacy, or some combination of both outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity.
If B), then:
D) The creation of a crime tariff, the resulting disrespect for the law, the creation of a potential for blackmail, the potential for discriminatory enforcement, or some combination of those outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity.
I tackle the first horn of the dilemma and argue that A) does not imply C). Effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity will not result in direct economic costs or privacy costs that outweigh the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity. Because showing that one horn of the dilemma is not actually problematic is enough to reject the dilemma. I do not discuss whether B) implies D), though I believe a much better case can be made for this claim. Especially, it seems to me that traditionally legislation against infidelity has been discriminatorily enforced by disproportionality targeting female offenders. 69 Moore, Placing Blame, 663. 70 Ibid., 664. 71 Ibid. See also Moore, "Liberty's Constraints on What Should Be Made Criminal," 203.
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Direct Economic Cost
Direct economic costs cannot be directly morally relevant. Economic resources only have moral value insofar as they are a means of achieving some morally valuable goals. However, direct economic costs are indirectly morally relevant. The achievement of most morally valuable goals requires the expenditure of some resources. Effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity will have some economic costs. For direct economic costs to provide a reason against criminalizing infidelity which outweighs the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity, it must be true that if we spend the resources required to effectively enforce a criminal ban on infidelity, it is impossible to realize a set of goals that are jointly more morally valuable to realize than effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity, and which it would have been possible to realize if resources had not been spent on enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity. Call these goals "V."
Most can probably name some goals which are more morally valuable to realize than punishing adulterers, and which cannot be realized while also enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity assuming that the revenues and the resources spent on other things than enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity and realizing V are held constant. However, this assumption is unwarranted. It needs to be argued that the costs of realizing V should be covered by not enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity instead of cutting back on other expenses or finding new sources of revenue. Thus, these two further propositions both need to be true:
Available Expenditure: The resources spent on achieving less morally valuable goals than enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity are insufficient to cover the expenses of effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity and simultaneously realizing V.
Available Revenue: The additional resources that are morally permissible to access are insufficient to cover the expenses of effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity and simultaneously realizing V. will probably be able to mention some. In order for Available Revenue to be true, it needs to be argued that taxes could not permissibly be raised in order to afford both the enforcement of a criminal ban on infidelity and realizing V. It might be difficult to argue that raising taxes is impermissible in order to achieve a goal, which, according to Moore's theory, it is the proper business of the state to pursue: punishing the immoral act of infidelity. One possible line of argument for the truth of Available Revenue could be that currently, or at some point, falling short of covering the costs of enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity, additional revenue cannot be accessed, because the negative externalities of raising the tax rate (e.g., disincentive to work)
would decrease societal wealth such that an increase in the tax rate would actually cause a decrease in the overall tax-income. I cannot pursue this further here. 
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Ultimately, it is an empirical question whether the direct economic cost of effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity provides a reason against criminalizing infidelity which outweighs the reason in favour of criminalization. However, I have shown that in order for this to be so some further controversial propositions must be true. At the very least, this raises reasonable doubt about whether infidelity should not be criminalized because of the direct economic costs of enforcing such a law.
Privacy Costs
I now discuss the privacy costs of enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity. It should be noted that in his remarks on privacy Moore only suggests that enforcement of a law can violate privacy. 74 Thus, only this sense of privacy is discussed and I shall not discuss privacy in the stronger senses where it can be violated by the mere existence of a law. 75 Moore illustrates privacy-violating enforcement of the law, with the following example:
At one point in time, the federal park rangers in Yosemite National Park sought to enforce the legislation against homosexual behaviour by placing peep-holes over the stalls in the men's bathroom, so that they could see into each of such stalls and check for illegal behaviour. This kind of evidence gathering is costly to a society, both in terms of the privacy, and in terms of the dignity of all concerned.
76
The question now is whether enforcement of a criminal ban on infidelity would have to include privacy-violating measures in order to be effective. After all, there is some likeness with the example Moore provides. The acts of infidelity that interest us here are sexual in nature, and they will typically be carried out in private. Installing peep-holes in the bedrooms of all citizens could be a very effective way of enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity. However, effective enforcement of a law is not perfect enforcement. If it is a requirement of effectively enforcing a law that all who break it are caught, then no laws are effectively enforced. Furthermore, effective enforcement is 74 Moore, Placing Blame, 664. 75 For such a conception of privacy (though one Moore cannot appeal to since it is incompatible with his legal moralism), see Duff, Answering for Crime. 76 Moore, Placing Blame, 664. 78 Ibid., 310. 79 Presumably, privacy can be invaded without being violated, the former being compatible with respecting privacy while the latter is not. 80 Quoted from Parent, "A New Definition of Privacy for the Law," 311.
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Only the second requirement can be problematic for a law criminalizing infidelity in general, as opposed to ruling out particular means of enforcement. Presumably, the legitimate need for invading privacy is punishing those who commit the moral wrong of infidelity, and arguing that criminalizing infidelity violates A. can only be done by either rejecting Moore's theory or denying that infidelity is morally wrong. Enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity can only violate C. if there is another, less intrusive way to enforce the criminal ban, which means there is no problem for a law criminalizing infidelity in general. While it is surely possible to point to violations of D. and E., it is
hard to see that there should be some ways of enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity that could be ruled out in principle, because they violated D. and E.
We are left with B., the probable cause requirement. Appropriately, it is this requirement that is flagrantly violated by the Yosemite National Park rangers when they install peep-holes above the bathroom-stalls. Installing the peep-holes because someone might engage in homosexual activities in the stalls presumably enables park rangers to obtain lots of irrelevant information in connection with people using the bathroom stalls for their intended purpose. It is conceivable that there are laws for which every effective means of enforcement will have to violate the probable cause requirement. The question is whether a criminal ban on infidelity would be such a law.
One reason for thinking that a criminal ban on infidelity can be effectively enforced without violating the probable cause requirement is that infidelity has a victim, a non-consenting person who is actually wronged, namely the deceived partner. The informed suspicions of the deceived partner might help give the police probable cause for knowing when and where infidelity occurs, enabling enforcement, without acquiring sensitive and irrelevant information, and respecting the probable cause requirement. That the informed suspicions of the deceived partner can give the police probable cause may be particularly clear when the deceived partner lives with the adulterer. First, there is the possibility of catching the unfaithful partner red-handed. Second, the deceived partner is in a good position to form true beliefs about the unfaithful partner's infidelity on the basis of otherwise inexplicable patterns of behaviour (i.e., a sudden systematic pattern of the unfaithful partner "working late"), and intimate knowledge of the romantic partner.
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Admittedly, a society where spouses report one another to the police for infidelity sounds potentially morally problematic (and yet, it hardly seems problematic that one spouse can report another spouse to the police for domestic abuse), but it is far from clear that it is morally problematic because it violates privacy in the sense mentioned by Moore. For one thing, this worry about the effects of a criminal ban on infidelity seems unconnected to the enforcement of the criminal ban. The worry would arise whether the ban was effectively enforced or not, since even a very ineffective law against infidelity would allow one partner to report another for infidelity. It cannot be this worry Moore has in mind when he writes about privacy, since he seems only to worry (explicitly) about whether enforcement can violate privacy.
The presence of a victim of infidelity makes it realistic that a criminal ban on infidelity could be effectively enforced without violating the probable cause requirement, and, thus, First, one way to deny the conclusion is to deny that infidelity is (more than trivially) morally wrong. This seems to me deeply implausible, but has not been conclusively argued to be false here. Secondly, while I argued that Moore has not provided any reason against criminalizing infidelity that can outweigh the positive reason to criminalize it provided by the moral 81 This is not to say that it may not violate privacy on some conceptions of privacy, which Moore has not appealed to.
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wrongfulness of it, I have not been argued that Moore's theory prevents him from giving such a reason. Maybe Moore could appeal to some hitherto unmentioned value which enables him to deny that his theory implies that infidelity should be criminalized. The best candidate for this is probably some stronger conception of privacy. Third, I have not demonstrated that the direct costs of effectively enforcing a criminal ban on infidelity could not provide a reason against criminalizing infidelity which outweighed the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity. However, I
have argued that the additional propositions that must be true for this to be the case are quite radical. Fourth, since all the values provided some reason against criminalizing infidelity, it remains possible that they jointly provide a reason which could outweigh the positive reason to criminalize infidelity. This seems to me unlikely. This is so partly because I argued that if infidelity is wrong it is a quite serious moral wrong, which means the reason in favour of criminalizing infidelity is quite 
